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State v. Rhone '
On the evening of May 13, 1974, a patrolman of the St. Louis Police
Department observed a burglary in progress in a supermarket. Another
officer responded to a report of the burglary and observed the defen-
dant Rhone descending from the roof of the market. The defendant was
apprehended, searched, and found to be in possession of a .38 caliber
handgun which had been taken from inside the supermarket. As the
defendant was being taken into custody, a second man was arrested on
the roof of the market. The arresting officer also discovered a hole
which had been cut in the roof in order to gain entry into the building.
A police laboratory technician later arrived at the scene. He collected
particles of tar, tarpaper, wood, and insulation from around the hole in
the roof and put them into a package later delivered to the police
laboratory. At the laboratory Lloyd Hill compiled a report of the results
of microscopic and spectographic comparisons he performed on the
clothes worn by the defendant on the night of the burglary. Hill con-
cluded in his report that the glass fibers and tar material found on the
defendant's clothing came from the scene of the crime.
At trial, the state called Edith Struckhoff to testify as custodian of the
police laboratory records. Her testimony was employed to qualify Hill's
report under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.2 Struck-
hoff also testified as to Hill's qualifications as an expert. She stated that
Hill had been working in the police department laboratory as a
criminologist for about a year, and that in order to be employed by the
laboratory as a criminologist, one must have a degree in that field.
Struckhoff then was allowed to read from the report concerning the
comparison tests made by Hill. It was brought out on cross-examination
that Struckhoff had no personal knowledge of anything reflected in the
report and that she did not know how the tests were conducted. The
laboratory report was received into evidence over the defendant's objec-
1. 555 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. Section 490.680, RSMo 1969 provides:
A record of an act, condition or event shall insofar as relevant, be
competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to
its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition
or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa-




Baumgart: Baumgart: Evidence--Evaluative Reports within Business Records
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tions that the testimony was hearsay, that he would be deprived of his
constitutional right to cross-examine a witness against him, and that the
person who performed the test had not been properly qualified as an
expert. The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree.
The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. Upon application of the defendant, the cause was transferred
to the Missouri Supreme Court where the conviction was also affirmed.
The only contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in allow-
ing Struckhoff to testify as to the contents of the laboratory report be-
cause Hill was not shown to be an expert on the subject matter of the
report. The court first cited Allen v. St. Louis Public Service Co.3 as au-
thority for the proposition a report in the form of an opinion is admissi-
'ble under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. The court
then addressed the question whether entries representing opinion evi-
dence are admissible under the Act in the absence of a showing that the
person making the entries is qualified as an expert. In the absence of
prior Missouri law the Rhone court concluded that opinions contained in
business records are admissible only if the declarant is an expert making
a statement concerning a matter within his expertise and as to which he
would be competent to express an opinion if he were testifying in per-
son. The court indicated that the standards used in qualifying an expert
for purposes of the business records exception are no different from
those used in qualifying an expert to testify at trial.4  The court con-
cluded by stating that the determination of whether such standards have
been met is within the sound discretion of the trial court.5
Following this analysis, the Rhone court noted that the evidence
showed that Hill had been employed by the police laboratory for ap-
proximately one year; that the nature of his job was to examine clothing
and debris; and that he must have had a degree in his particular field."
The court then held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
ruling that Hill had been properly qualified as an expert. The dissent
quarrelled with this holding on the ground that the only witness to tes-
tify concerning Hill knew nothing specific about his qualifications.
The main point of departure in the dissent, however, was not the
qualification issue. Judge Bardgett, with whom Judge Seiler concurred,
emphatically argued that the admission of this opinion evidence under
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act 7 in a criminal trial vio-
3. 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956). Allen was a civil case in which no
confrontation problems would arise.
4. 555 S.W.2d at 841, citing Hyman v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 359 Mo.
1097, 225 S.W.2d 734 (1949); Herman v. American Car & Foundry Co., 245
S.W. 387 (St. L. Mo. App. 1922).
5. See State v. Rose, 249 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. En Banc 1952).
6. 555 S.W.2d at 842.
7. See note 2 supra.
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lated the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him pro-
tected by the Missouri and United States Constitutions.8
Although the language of the Missouri Constitution would suggest a
strong confrontation argument, 9 Missouri courts have been unwilling to
strike down application of hearsay exceptions on that basis. In State v.
McO'Blenis 10 the Missouri Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether the introduction of prior recorded testimony against a defen-
dant in a criminal trial violated his right to be confronted by the wit-
nesses against him as guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution. In a
lengthy opinion, the court held that the constitution was not intended to
upset exceptions to the hearsay rule which were well established when
the constitution was adopted." This reasoning was later approved in
State v. Durham, 12 in which the court held that because a hospital record
qualified as a hearsay exception under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act, its introduction into evidence did not violate Missouri's
confrontation clause.
Under the federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
been more receptive to confrontation arguments attacking the applica-
tion of hearsay exceptions in criminal cases. It was held at an early date,
however, that the confrontation clause is not a bar to all hearsay evi-
dence. In Mattox v. United States 13 two witnesses who had testified against
the defendant had died since the first trial, and the prosecutor was al-
lowed to read their former testimony into evidence at the second trial.
In emphasizing the necessity of allowing the prior testimony into evi-
dence, the Court analogized the situation to that of using dying declara-
tions.
It was not until 1967 in Pointer v. Texas 14 that the Supreme Court
applied the confrontation clause to the states by means of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held it error to
admit testimony at trial which had been given at a preliminary hearing
at which the defendant was not represented by counsel. Pointer, how-
ever, was decided on both confrontation and right to counsel grounds.
Three years later the Court had occasion to examine exceptions to the
hearsay rule solely in terms of the confrontation clause. In Barber v.
Page 15 the transcript of a witness' preliminary hearing testimony was
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18a.
9. "That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to
meet the witnesses against him face to face; ... " Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18a (em-
phasis added).
10. 24 Mo. 402 (1857).
11. Id. at 417.
12. 418 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1967).
13. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
14. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
15. 390 U.S. 718 (1968).
1978] 765
3
Baumgart: Baumgart: Evidence--Evaluative Reports within Business Records
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
admitted into evidence at the defendant's criminal trial under the prior
recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule. This exception re-
quires unavailability of the witness as a condition precedent to admissi-
bility. The Court held that technical unavailability, in the sense of a mere
showing that the witness is absent from the jurisdiction, is not sufficient
to fulfill confrontation demands. Actual unavailability must be estab-
lished by a good faith effort to secure the presence of the witness at
trial.1 6
The next significant development in the confrontation-hearsay area
was in California v. Green. 17 In Green the state's witness remembered
nothing of his prior statements or of his testimony at the preliminary
hearing. The defendant's attorney had cross-examined the witness at the
preliminary hearing. This preliminary hearing testimony was admitted
into evidence in order to refresh the witness' memory under a California
statute allowing admission for the purpose of proving the truth of the
matter asserted. The United States Supreme Court held that neither the
admission of this evidence nor the California statute violated the con-
frontation clause. The Court went on to state that the admission of a
declarant's out-of-cou'rt statement does not violate the confrontation
clause as long as the declarant is testifying at trial and is subject to full
and effective cross-examination.
Although Green strongly emphasized the opportunity to cross-examine
the out-of-court declarant, any implication that this was a constitutional
requirement was dispelled in Dutton v. Evans. 8 A cellmate of one of the
defendant's co-conspirators was called to testify at trial. He testified that
his cellmate had said: "[I]f it hadn't been for [the defendant], we
wouldn't be in this right now." The Court held that admission of this
testimony under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule did not
violate the confrontation clause.
Three factors were central to the holding in Dutton. First, the Court
emphasized the "indicia of reliability" of the evidence and indicated that
its concern was that the trier of fact have a satisfactory basis for deter-
mining the truth of the prior statement. The Court concluded that the
statement was trustworthy because it was spontaneous and against the
penal interest of the declarant. The Court also said that the evidence was
not "crucial or devastating" because it was of peripheral significance in
comparison to the testimony of the eyewitness and the other nineteen
witnesses for the state. Finally, the Court noted that there would have
been no utility in cross-examination of the declarant. The Court found it
inconceivable that cross-examination would have shown that the co-con-
spirator was not in a position to know whether Evans was involved in the
crime.
16. Id.
17. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
18. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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An analysis of Rhone under these three factors lends little support to
the result reached by the Missouri court. First, had Hill been in court to
testify, it would have been possible for the defense to probe his qualifi-
cations as an expert. Of even greater significance to the defense and
consequently to the trier of fact would have been an examination of the
methods used by Hill in arriving at his conclusion that the particles
found on the defendant's clothing matched those retrieved from the
scene of the break-in. For example, Hill could have been cross-
examined concerning the margin for error in the tests used, the degree
of judgment used in arriving at the test results, and the degree to which
other experts would agree with Hill's interpretation of the tests. Whether
the answers to questions in these and other areas would have weakened
the evidentiary value of Hill's findings is not known; this is precisely the
problem.
Another factor discussed in Dutton was the peripheral significance of
the contested evidence. In Rhone the only evidence other than the
laboratory report that placed the defendant at the scene of the break-in
was the testimony of the arresting officers. One officer testified that he
was unable to see clearly the facial features of either man. However, he
did testify that one of the men was wearing a dark blue shirt and plain
trousers. This description matched the clothing worn by the defendant.
The other officer stated that he apprehended the defendant descending
from the roof of the market, and that the defendant was found to be in
possession of a pistol which had been taken in the burglary. The defen-
dant testified that he had come upon the scene of the burglary only
after the police arrived, and that he had found the gun lying on the
ground near the market. The believability of the defendant's testimony
was significantly colored by the laboratory report which placed him at
the scene of the break-in. As the dissent in Rhone pointed out, the
laboratory report was powerful evidence that the defendant had been in
the building especially if consideration is given to the weight accorded to
modern scientific evidence. 19 The admission of this laboratory report
was "crucial and devastating" to the defendant's case within the meaning
of Dutton.
The main thrust of the Court's reasoning in Dutton turned on the
finding that the hearsay statement had "indicia of reliability." In a busi-
ness record, the recording of easily observable facts such as employment
records,2 0 hours worked,2 1 goods sold, or services performed, 22 may
have sufficient indicia of reliability; it is safe to assume that the percep-
19. 555 S.W.2d at 844 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
20. Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1957).
21. Gallizzi v. Scave, 406 Pa. 629, 179 A.2d 638 (1962).
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tion of the person who observed these simple acts was accurate. The
recording of a mere conclusion should not carry with it such an assump-
tion of accuracy. As the dissent in Rhone pointed out, there was no evi-
dence from which the trial court could assume that the conclusions were
of such a routine character as to be inherently reliable. Therefore, the
test results in Rhone did not carry sufficient indicia of reliability tinder
the Dutton analysis.
Another problem raised by the use of business records as evidence is
that such records are often prepared in anticipation of litigation.23 The
objection to records prepared for use at trial is that they do not have the
inherent reliability characteristic of day-to-day records made in the ordi-
nary course of business.24 This lack of trustworthiness is the touchstone
of the routine exclusion of records made in preparation for litigation.25
Although it can be argued that the laboratory reports in Rhone were
prepared solely for investigative purposes, such an argument ignores the
fact that the reports were also compiled for possible use in a criminal
prosecution. This may further weaken the reliability of the evidence.
In its discussion of indicia of reliability in Dutton, the Court said that
the confrontation clause reflects a practical concern for the accuracy of
the truth-determining process in criminal trials. This goal, according to
the Court, is achieved by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of a hearsay statement. The Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act reflects a similar concern for accuracy.
Before hearsay evidence in a business record will be admitted, evidence.
must be presented as to the identity of the business record and its mode
of preparation. 26 The record is then admissible only if the trial court
determines in the exercise of its sound discretion 27 that a sufficient
foundation has been laid. 28
The extent to which Dutton may limit a court's discretion in admitting
business records in criminal trials is unclear. The confrontation clause
may require more foundation testimony than is necessary in civil cases.
Courts could require the person identifying the record and testifying as
to its mode of preparation to be technically familiar with the procedures
used in the analysis being reported. This could be accomplished by call-
ing the original entrant to the stand. Where this is not feasible because
that person is no longer working in the police laboratory or is unavail-
23. It was the contention of the dissent that these records were memoranda
made by the prosecuting team for use at trial. 555 S.W.2d at 847 (Bardgett, J.,
dissenting).
24. W.E. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388,
1403 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
25. Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1960).
26. See note 2 supra.
27. State v. Boyington, 544 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Thomas v.
Fred Weber Contractor, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
28. See cases cited note 27 supra.
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able for other reasons, someone familiar with the process could be called
to testify.
This method would give the defendant an opportunity to engage in a
meaningful cross-examination as to the factors involved in arriving at the
conclusion in the business record. The jury would also be given a suffi-
cient basis to evaluate the truth of the report, thus fulfilling the concerns
of the Supreme Court in Dutton. Such a constitutional gloss on a hearsay
exception requirement is not unprecedented. Since Barber v. Page 29 the
Supreme Court has required actual unavailability of a witness as a condi-
tion precedent to the use of his prior recorded testimony at a criminal
trial.
Actual unavailability of the entrant should be required in business rec-
ord cases. The Missouri common law business records exception to the
hearsay rule required unavailability. 30 This procedure emphasized the
necessity of using a business record because the entrant's testimony was
not available.3 1 In Missouri's statutory business records exception, 32 the
unavailability requirement has been eliminated33 as a matter of conveni-
ence. In criminal cases in which life or liberty may be lost, convenience
should be secondary to the right of a defendant to confront the wit-
nesses against him. The objection is not that the hearsay statement of an
unavailable witness is more reliable than the hearsay statement of an
available witness. Rather, a prosecutor should not be allowed to use rela-
tively unreliable evidence (the business record) when more reliable tes-
timony is available. Such constitutional requirement of unavailability may
nonetheless be impractical. Police departments would be unduly bur-
dened by a rule requiring them to keep track of laboratory technicians
who had left their employ. Prosecutors could be seriously inconveni-
enced if they were required to arrange for the appearance at trial of
laboratory technicians who are not actually unavailable. Finally, even if
the laboratory technician were actually unavailable, the analysis con-
tained in the record would be no more trustworthy.
A variant of this approach has been suggested by one writer 34 and
adopted by statute in Iowa. By giving ten days notice to the prosecutor,
29. 390 U.S. 718 (1968).
30. Missouri Forged Tool Co. v. St. Louis Car Co., 205 S.W.2d 298 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1947); Bedwell v. Capitol Motor Ass'n, 66 S.W.2d 962 (K.C. Mo. App.
1933); Einstein v. Holladay-Klotz Land & Lumber Co., 118 Mo. App. 184, 94
S.W. 296 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906).
31. The Supreme Court also emphasized a necessity requirement by requir-
ing actual unavailability in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 718.
32. See note 2 supra.
33. Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co., 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. En Banc 1959);
Ellis v. State Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare, 285 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. En Banc
1955).
34. Comment, Evaluative Reports By Public Officials-Admissible As Official State-
ment?, 30 TEx. L. Rv. 112 (1951).
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